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Community Reinvestment Act Final Rule: Will the
FDIC Eventually Adopt the New Regulations?
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1977, Congress stated that banks have continuing and
affirmative obligations to help meet the credit needs of local
communities,
especially low-and moderate-income (“LMI”)
neighborhoods where they are chartered, in a manner consistent with the
safe and sound operations of the institutions.1 Congress came to this idea
based on previous chartering laws requiring banks to demonstrate that
their facilities serve the convenience and needs of their community, LMI
neighborhoods, and credit and deposit services.2
The Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”) was enacted in an
attempt to ensure that insured depository institutions satisfy their
obligations to meet the credit needs of their entire community;
specifically LMI neighborhoods. 3 The CRA requires the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“FDIC”), and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors
(“FRB”) to use periodic “performance evaluations” to assess the
performance of depository institutions in fulfilling these obligations.4
The OCC oversees nationally chartered banks and federal savings
associations, the FRB oversees state chartered banks that are members of
the Federal Reserve System (“FRS”), and the FDIC oversees insured state
banks that are not members of the FRS.5

1. See e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., History of the CRA (Dec. 7,
2018),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/consumerscommunities/cra_history.htm
[https://perma.cc/6FBY-HZYF] [hereinafter FED. RES.]; Community Reinvestment Act, 12
U.S.C. § 2901 (2012) (describing all the changes made to help the credit needs of LMI
neighborhoods); Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. 34734, 34758
(June 5, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 25 and 195) (explaining banks’ continuing and
affirmative obligations to LMI neighborhoods).
2. Id.
3. See 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (mandating financial institutions to “help meet the credit needs of
the local communities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound operation
of such institutions”).
4. Community Reinvestment Act: Background & Purpose, FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION
COUNSEL (Sept. 6,
2018, 5:52
PM), https://www.ffiec.gov/cra/history.htm
[https://perma.cc/25C4-FMTV].
5. Id.
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In October of 2020, the OCC adopted a final rule that modified
how regulators rate banks on their community reinvestment efforts.6 This
rule created a more objective and transparent standard for evaluating a
bank’s community reinvestment performance. 7 In addition to providing
a more objective standard, the rule encourages banks to invest, lend, and
provide more loans to their respective communities and LMI
neighborhoods.8
Beginning in 2021, the CRA will proscribe that 80% of banks will
be subject to the FDIC and FRB regulatory regime, while the other 20%
will be subject to the OCC regulatory regime.9 The FDIC originally
signaled its agreement with the OCC’s December 2019 Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking by engaging in a joint-rulemaking session with its
fellow agency.10 The FDIC has since stated at the end of 2020 that it
should not go through with the rulemaking during the COVID-19
pandemic.11 Since, in the end, only the OCC adopted the new rule, but
not the FDIC or FRB, only nationally chartered banks must adhere to this
rule.12 This could lead to opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, since
state chartered banks do not have to adhere to this rule.13
The OCC’s new rule, effective October 1, 2020 sounds promising
on its face, but does it actually achieve the goals that it desires?14 In some
ways it certainly does; the rule increases credit for mortgage origination
in an attempt to increase the availability of affordable mortgages in LMI
areas, and it increases support for small businesses, as well as small and
6. See generally Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. 34734 (June 5,
2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 25 and 195) (explaining all of the provisions of the final
rule).
7. Joseph Otting, The Final CRA Rule Is In. Here’s Why It’s Better, AM. BANKER (May 20,
2020, 8:02 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/the-final-cra-rule-is-in-hereswhy-its-better [https://perma.cc/7C5D-NAMF].
8. Id.
9. Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. at 34739.
10. Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. 1204 (proposed Jan. 9, 2020)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 345).
11. Id.
12. Laurie Goodman et al., The OCC’s Final CRA Rule Improves Upon the Proposed Rule
but
Remains
Unsatisfactory,
URBAN
INST.
(July
2020),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/102515/the-occs-final-cra-ruleimproves-upon-the-proposed-rule-but-remains-unsatisfactory_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/EAP6BHFL].
13. Id.
14. See generally Scott Coleman et al., The OCC’s Final CRA Rule: What Changed from
the
Agency’s
Proposed
Rule?,
JD
SUPRA
(June
15,
2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-occ-s-final-cra-rule-what-changed-62599/
[https://perma.cc/E4UU-E8JV] (outlining major changes from the CRA and explaining in
detail what they attempt to accomplish).
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family-owned farms.15 However, in some ways it came up short—there
was no evidence of the proposed rule’s impact on LMI areas and there is
still uncertainty as to how effective the new final rule will be in assessing
banks.16
This Note addresses whether the OCC’s final rule actually
accomplishes the goals it desires and whether the FDIC will eventually
adopt this new policy. Part II explains the history and development of
the CRA and how banks have been evaluated under it in the past.17 Part
III examines whether the final rule accomplishes the goals it desires by
weighing the support of the final rule against the critiques. 18 Part IV
concludes by discussing whether the FDIC will eventually adopt these
new regulations.19
II. CRA HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
Congress passed the CRA in 1977 to require the OCC, FRB, and
FDIC to examine financial institutions and encourage them to help meet
the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered, as
well as LMI neighborhoods. 20 Since its passage in 1977, the CRA has
been periodically updated in order to provide more objective standards
and resolve financial and economic issues during the relevant time
period.21 In 1989, the CRA was modified to require regulators to provide
more detailed written evaluations, publicly disclose CRA results, and
establish a tiered rating system.22
In 1991, the FDIC Improvement Act (“FDICIA”) strengthened
the role of the FDIC by giving it an increased role in overseeing banks

15. See generally Otting, supra note 7 (explaining how an increase in credit for mortgage
origination positively affects LMI households).
16. Goodman, supra note 12.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (2012); see also 12 U.S.C. §
2903(a)(2) (2012) (explaining the examination process when evaluating a bank’s CRA
performance).
21. FED. RES., supra note 1.
22. The CRA temporarily created the Resolution Trust Corp. in an attempt to help the
nation's failed savings and loan institutions. In addition, the CRA abolished the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, as well as created the Savings Association
Insurance Fund and the Bank Insurance Fund. Regulations were also finalized to make sure
that real estate appraisals are performed to a certain standard, including requirements for
adequate training of appraisers and of their supervisors. See 12 U.S.C. § 2906 (2012)
(describing all other changes that were made to the CRA at this time).
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and protecting consumers.23 Congress enacted the FDICIA as a response
to the Savings and Loan Crisis—an event that caused the failure of nearly
a third of the U.S. savings and loan associations by 1995. 24 The FDICIA
created the Truth in Savings Act, which requires banks to provide
disclosures regarding savings account interest rates, allowing consumers
the ability to compare products offered by different banks so that they
have more information.25
The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency
Act of 1994 requires separate CRA performance assessments in every
state where a bank has an actual physical presence. 26 It also requires an
agency to evaluate an out-of-state national bank's CRA rating or a state
bank's CRA rating when deciding whether to allow banks to build
interstate branches.27
In 1995, the CRA regulations were updated in an attempt to
account for an institution’s size and business operations.28 The updates
in 1995 instituted three “performance tests.”29 First, the Lending Test,
which is the most heavily weighted in terms of a bank’s CRA rating, rates
institutions on the number, amount, and distribution of loans across
different geographic neighborhoods and income groups.30 Second, the

23. 12 U.S.C. § 1811(a) (2010).
24. Julia Kagan, FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA), INVESTOPEDIA (July 16, 2020),

https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federal-deposit-insurance-corporation-improvementact-fdicia.asp [https://perma.cc/7JRM-GTQR]; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (outlining all of the
changes made to the FDICIA).
25. See 12 U.S.C. § 1811(b)(3) (explaining how this act requires financial institutions with
over $500 million in consolidated assets to go through extremely thorough financial audits
and be in accordance with additional annual reporting requirements. Financial institutions that
fail to comply with FDICIA requirements would face civil penalties and additional actions
from regulators).
26. 12 U.S.C. § 2906(d).
27. Bill Medley, Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994,
FED. RES. HIST., https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/riegle_neal_act_of_1994
[https://perma.cc/5EH3-GRSJ] (last visited Jan. 11, 2020).
28. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22156, 22156 (July 1,
1995) (“The final rule seeks to emphasize performance rather than process, to promote
consistency in evaluations, and to eliminate unnecessary burden. As compared to the 1993
and 1994 proposals, the final rule reduces recordkeeping and reporting requirements and
makes other modifications and clarifications.”); see also Sandra F. Braunstein,, The
Community
Reinvestment
Act,
FED.
RES.
(Feb.
13,
2008),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/braunstein20080213a.htm
[https://perma.cc/R2ZB-84H3] (explaining the details of the 1995 changes to the CRA).
29. John Alexander et al., Effects of Revisions to the CRA in 1995 on Regulatory
Enforcement, 7 J. OF BUS. AND ECON. RES. 1 (2009).
30. SANDRA F. BRAUNSTEIN, DIR., D IV. OF CONSUMER AND CMTY. AFFS., THE COMMUNITY
REINVESTMENT
ACT
(Feb.
13,
2008),
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Investment Test examines how well the institution meets the needs of the
local communities by making community investments.31 Lastly, the
Service Test evaluates the ability of the institution to meet the credit
needs of the community and LMI neighborhoods through its retail service
delivery system.32 This was the first time that these tests were used for
evaluating a bank’s CRA rating.33 The determinations of these tests also
introduced asset size thresholds to define whether a bank would be
considered a small or large bank, thereby subjecting them to different
regulations.34
In 2005, the CRA’s regulations were updated to adjust the asset
size thresholds35 for small and large banks depending on what the
Consumer Price Index (“CPI”) proscribes. 36 The CPI is an index that
measures the average change over time in prices paid by urban consumers
for a market basket of consumer goods and services. 37 The CRA
regulations added an intermediate small bank category to classify
institutions by size, and it expanded the definition of community
development to broaden the geographic areas where activities can qualify
for CRA recognition.38
Other efforts to update the regulation occurred in 2018, including
attempts to make receiving CRA credit clearer and more transparent.39
Updates also extended the CRA examination cycle for some banks and
reduced the amount of discretion that examiners possess in deciding
whether to evaluate banks under a full or limited scope examination. 40
As of today, performance evaluations are based on two criteria:
(1) whether a bank is a nationally chartered bank or a state-chartered bank
and (2) a consideration of the size of the bank. 41 Large banks with assets
totaling more than $1.252 billion have the most comprehensive test,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/braunstein20080213a.htm
[https://perma.cc/R2ZB-84H3].
31. Alexander et al., supra note 29, at 2.
32. BRAUNSTEIN, supra note 30.
33. Id.
34. Id. at n.1.
35. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. 83,747, 83,747 (Dec. 23,
2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, 345) (explaining how the size of a bank’s assets
will consider them a “small institution”, “intermediate small institution”, or “large
institution”).
36. 12 C.F.R. § 228.12(u) (2012).
37. Consumer Price Index, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, https://www.bls.gov/cpi/
[https://perma.cc/CT4S-LMLL] (last visited Feb. 2, 2021).
38. § 228.12(u).
39. FED. RES, supra note 1.
40. Id.
41. 12 C.F.R. § 25 (2020).
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consisting of the Lending Test, Service Test, and Investment Test.42 Both
large and small banks are subject to the Lending Test, which evaluates
the number and monetary amount of home mortgage, small farm, small
business, and consumer loans with all of the income levels in the bank’s
assessment area.43 The Service Test examines the availability and
effectiveness of a bank’s retail banking services and how they give
community development services in their assessment areas. 44 Finally, the
Investment Test weighs the investment’s complexity, dollar amount, and
its benefit to the assessment area.45 It also assesses the likelihood that
private investors will provide investments and gives an inferior grade
depending on the size of the private investors’ contribution.46
CRA ratings are made by the summation of points received on
the three tests (Lending, Investment, and Services Tests). 47 Regulators,
like the OCC and FDIC, use these ratings when pondering a bank’s
application to expand facilities, relocate an office, open up new branches,
and merge with other banks.48 In addition to these requirements, a bank’s
CRA rating must be satisfactory or better to establish a financial
subsidiary.49 If a bank receives a CRA rating below satisfactory and
already has financial subsidiaries, it cannot commence any additional
activity or acquire control of any company until they receive a
satisfactory CRA rating.50 Additionally, a bank holding company’s
depository institution’s subsidiaries must have a CRA rating of
satisfactory or above for the bank holding company to ask the FRB to
treat it as a financial holding company.51 If the bank holding company is
treated as a financial holding company, it can engage in a broader array

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Questions and Answers, OFF. OF THE

COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/consumers-andcommunities/cra/cra-questions-and-answers.html [https://perma.cc/Z3W7-GG2Q] (last
visited Feb. 4, 2021).
48. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(2) (2018).
49. 12 U.S.C. § 24(a)(7); see also 12 C.F.R. § 208.75 (2020) (defining a financial
subsidiary and its features).
50. 12 C.F.R. § 208.75(a) (2020); see also 12 C.F.R. § 208.75(a)(2) (2020) (explaining
how a CRA grade generally works).
51. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(2) (explaining how a bank holding company can become a
financial holding company).
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of activities, undoubtedly a strong incentive for banks to obtain a
satisfactory or above rating.52
III. DOES THE CRA ACCOMPLISH ITS GOALS
A.

Criticisms of the CRA

Many critics find the CRA requirements vague and have asked
for more clear and concise guidelines to determine what constitutes an
acceptable means of reinvesting into the community and LMI
neighborhoods.53 Critics frequently disagree over what should receive
CRA credit.54 Many argue that the standard is too subjective. Sometimes
loans or investments do not count as CRA credit even though most would
say that credit is warranted given that such loans and investments will
positively impact local communities and LMI neighborhoods.55
The National Community Reinvestment Coalition (“NCRC”) and
American Bankers Association (“ABA”) disagree about small business
lending and whether it should be considered for community development
credit.56 The ABA argues that loans to small businesses and nonprofits
with an actual purpose of community development should be considered
community development loans, so the CRA rating can correctly measure
the impact that banks have in their assessment areas.57 On the other hand,
the NCRC claims that “doing so would double count small business loans
and inflate the Lending Test rate.”58

52. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4) (listing the broad array of financial activities that financial
holding companies are permitted to engage in).
53. Letter from Robert E. Feldman, Exec. Sec’y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., to Comptroller
Otting and Chairman McWilliams, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Apr. 8, 2020),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/102005/community-reinvestment-actapril-8-2020-comment-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/PMW2-2RNB] [hereinafter Letter from
Robert Feldman].
54. Goodman, et al., supra note 12.
55. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 81 Fed. Reg. 48,506, 48,506 (July 25,
2016) (describing the confusion of the subjectiveness of the CRA).
56. Letter from John Taylor, President and CEO of the Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal., to
Steven T. Mnuchin, Sec’y of the Treasury (Feb. 5, 2018), https://ncrc.org/letter-to-treasury/
[https://perma.cc/RX5Z-HPHZ].
57.Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Questions and Answers, OFF. OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/consumers-andcommunities/cra/cra-questions-and-answers.html [https://perma.cc/Z3W7-GG2Q] (last
visited Feb. 4, 2021).
58. Letter from John Taylor, supra note 56.
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Critics of CRA also argue that it addresses a nonexistent
problem.59 They argue that the issues occurring in credit markets are
inadequate to justify intervention and that the CRA is the wrong policy
to effect those changes even if intervention is warranted. 60 Earlier
research found that the CRA did not have a positive effect on credit
markets and that the policies came at a high cost.61 For example, ten years
ago, corporate law professors Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, tried
to demonstrate the weak effects and high cost of the CRA in response to
changes made to the Act in 1989.62 They explained that the CRA is
unjustified, threatens the safety and soundness of the banking system, and
encourages community groups to seek out cheaper rent, only at the cost
of banks’ profitability.63 It is further argued that the CRA actually
provides little benefit to LMI neighborhoods and is costly because it
makes banks give unprofitable and risky loans to people with low credit
scores.64 Compliance costs are also high for these loans.65 Critics believe
that there are other alternatives that can overcome these market failures,
help lessen credit discrimination, and provide funds to help LMI
neighborhoods.66
B.

Changes Made by the Final Rule

The final rule’s updates could generally fit into four categories. 67
First, it clarifies which bank activities qualify for positive CRA
consideration.68 The rule defines a “qualifying activity” as an activity
that helps meet the credit needs of a bank’s entire community, including
LMI neighborhoods.69
Qualifying activities include retail loans,
59. See Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and
Its Critics, 80 N. Y. U. L. REV. 513 (2005) at 519 (explaining that although he is arguing in
favor of the CRA, other critics suggest that it is unnecessary to change it) (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 527.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 527–28.
63. Id.
64. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 81 Fed. Reg. 48506 (July 25, 2016)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. 25.26) (describing the concerns of how the CRA will actually help LMI
neighborhoods) (emphasis added).
65. Barr, supra note 59, at 519.
66. Id.
67. See generally Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. 34734 (June 5,
2020) (codified at 12 C.F.R. 25 and 12 C.F.R. 195) (discussing all the changes that have been
made to the final rule).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 34735.
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community development loans, community development investments,
and community development services.70
The OCC released a
comprehensive list to make the standard for what is considered a
“qualifying activity” more objective.71
The second area of change is redefining how banks delineate the
assessment areas in which they are evaluated based on changes to
banking business models over the past twenty-five years.72 The prior
regulatory framework only considered physical branches as the basis for
delineating a bank’s CRA assessment areas (“Facility-Based Assessment
Areas”). 73 The OCC acknowledged this standard no longer correctly
reflects the manner in which many banks conduct their business,
recognizing that many banks receive deposits from customers residing in
areas not contiguous with the bank’s physical facilities.74 The rule
requires a bank that receives 50% or more of its retail domestic deposits
from areas outside its own Facility-Based Assessment Areas to have
separate deposit-based assessment areas in places where it acquires 5%
or more of its total domestic deposits.75 Despite this realization, the rule
provides that an ATM does not constitute a “non-branch deposit-taking
facility” for the purpose of delineating a Facility-Based Assessment Area
wherever a bank has a main office, branch, or non-branch deposit-taking
facility.76 Banks can also change their assessment areas once per year. 77

70. Id.
71. See CRA Illustrative List of Qualifying Activities, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE

CURRENCY, DEPARTMENT OF TREAS. (2020), https://www.occ.gov/topics/consumers-andcommunities/cra/cra-qualifying-activities.pdf. [https://perma.cc/M325-BW95] (showing all
of the activities that “qualify” under the new regime); see also Community Reinvestment Act
Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. at 34735 (defining “qualifying activity”).
72. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. 34734, 34735 (explaining
all of the changes made to assessment areas based on online transactions, as well as in-person
transactions).
73. Debevoise & Plimpton, OCC Finalizes Rule Intended to Strengthen and Modernize
Community
Reinvestment
Act
Regulations
at
4
(2020),
https://www.debevoise.com/insights/publications/2020/05/occ-finalizes-rule-intended-tostrengthenand#:~:text=On%20May%2020%2C%202020%2C%20the%20OCC%20published%20a,20
20%2C%20with%20phased-in%20compliance%20dates%20beginning%20in%202023
[https://perma.cc/8KJ6-5BYF].
74. Id. at 5.
75. COVINGTON, OCC ISSUES FINAL RULE REVISING COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
REGULATIONS
at
4
(May
26,
2020),
https://www.cov.com//media/files/corporate/publications/2020/05/occ-issues-final-rule-revising-communityreinvestment-act-regulations.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MLS-87L3].
76. Id.
77. Id.
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The third general category of changes is articulating more
objective standards for evaluating banks’ CRA performances.78 This
includes incorporating a process for banks to petition the OCC to add a
new activity to the list of qualifying activities that receive credit under
the CRA.79 The OCC’s final rule also includes in its list of qualifying
activities certain categories of economic development activities that
currently qualify for CRA credit, showing how these updates do not
deviate entirely from the regulatory framework that was previously
used.80 Qualifying activities that were the main source of criticism by
communities, neighborhoods, and certain members of Congress—
including investing money into the construction of a stadium, or
benefiting opportunity zones—must directly benefit LMI neighborhoods
in order to receive credit as a “qualifying activity.”81 The rule also
permits activities that would have received CRA credit in the previous
evaluation periods to continue to get the same credit under the new
regulations, even if they are not specifically stated in the rule’s list of
qualifying activities.82
The rule’s fourth and final requirement mandates more
transparent and timely reporting.83 The OCC found that the CRA
performance evaluations can be difficult to navigate and use. 84 It can
also be onerous to make comparisons from one bank to another, or from
one bank’s evaluation to its other evaluations.85 The rule also gives credit
to a bank that originates and sells a loan within 365 days of origination in
the amount of the loan at its inception.86 Previously, a bank only received
credit when it originated and sold a loan within ninety days of origination,
so this update made it much easier to receive credit in this regard. 87 A
bank may also request confirmation from the OCC that an area is
considered a “CRA desert.”88

78. Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. 34734, 34769 (June 5, 2020)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. 25 and 12 C.F.R. 195).
79. COVINGTON, supra note 75, at 4.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. at 34737.
84. Debevoise & Plimpton, supra note 73, at 9.
85. Id.
86. COVINGTON, supra note 75, at 5.
87. Goodman, et al., supra note 12, at 4.
88. COVINGTON, supra note 75, at 5; see also Community Reinvestment Act Regulations,
85 Fed. Reg. at 34747 (explaining that a “CRA desert” is considered an area that experiences
lower than expected levels of lending and investments).
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Support and Critique of the Final Rule

Although the OCC’s final rule is certainly not perfect, it attempts
to fix prior issues that agencies had with the CRA in many ways. 89
Previously, banks would have only received 25% credit for loans sold
within ninety days.90 Under the new rule, banks will get credit for an
entire 100% of origination value for loans sold during the year the loan
was originated.91 This change primarily targets single-family mortgage
lenders, where many LMI loans are sold.92
There is generally better support for low-income families and
small businesses in the new proposal.93 The rule increased support to
small business, small and family-owned farms, Native American
territories, and distressed areas by using the “CRA desert” classification,
while also accommodating banks of all business models and sizes by
adjusting their asset size thresholds.94 This adjustment was accomplished
by both requiring banks to fund such communities in greater capacity, as
well as adding greater incentives to do so.95 Since there is now a
comprehensive list, there is finally more clarity in what qualifies for CRA
consideration under the OCC’s final rule. 96 Additionally, the rule
updated how banks define assessment areas by maintaining immediate
geographies around branches and establishing more assessment areas for
smaller banks that do not rely on branch networks to meet the needs of
their customers.97
Regulators are able to evaluate bank CRA performance more
objectively through quantitative measures that measure the value and
volume of bank activities.98 Some have argued that the CRA gave limited
evaluations to some banks, so the update requires regulators to
thoroughly evaluate banks’ CRA performance in all their assessment

89. See generally Letter from Robert Feldman, supra note 53 (describing the positive
attempts the final rule makes to making a more objective standard).
90. Goodman, et al., supra note 12, at 3.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller of the Currency
Highlights Final Rule Strengthening and Modernizing the Community Reinvestment Act
(May 20, 2020), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2020/nr-occ-202064.html [https://perma.cc/2J23-V9ED] [hereinafter OCC Press Release].
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. CRA Illustrative List of Qualifying Activities, supra note 71, at 1.
97. OCC Press Release, supra note 93.
98. Id.

412

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 25

areas.99 However, the OCC has deferred setting thresholds for assessing
banks' CRA performance until the agency can review and understand this
improved data.100 The rule also required regulators to consider
performance
context,
discrimination,
and
illegal
credit
activity before assigning their final ratings.101
Despite all these advantages, the FDIC did not adopt the rule due
to its many critiques.102 Additionally, there were complications with
finalizing this rule during the COVID-19 pandemic. 103 There was no
evidence of the proposed rule’s impact.104 Public data would be lost,
while bank reporting burdens would increase. 105 Furthermore, there is no
data indicating that the new rule will take a step towards making
standards more objective or make a bigger impact than the previous
regulations.106
The primary metric used for assessing CRA compliance also
neglected community needs.107 The bank-level CRA evaluation metric
emphasized the evaluation of banks’ activities on its bank-wide balance
sheet that displays “CRA-eligible activities,” rather than the investments
and loans made to serve LMI neighborhoods.108 The rule created limited
and, at times, unforgiving testing on retail and community development
lending, with a limit on community coverage. 109 Since banks would be
tested only for retail lines with at least 15% of the bank’s retail activities,
some large banks that do almost all of their business in one retail line
would not be evaluated on other lines because one retail line consisted of
more than 85% of their retail lending.110
There are modernization issues with the rule as well, namely a
huge time lag between examination and the issuance of exam reports. 111
The most recent reports available for some of the largest banks were
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Krista Shonk, Three Takeaways from CRA Modernization, ABA BANKING J. (July 9,

2020),
https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2020/07/three-takeaways-from-cramodernization%E2%80%AF/ [https://perma.cc/9RDD-ZNZQ].
103. See id. (describing the troubles of adopting a new rule when facing bigger issues due
to the COVID-19 pandemic).
104. Letter from Robert Feldman, supra note 53.
105. Goodman, et al., supra note 12, at 2.
106. Letter from Robert Feldman, supra note 53.
107. Goodman, et al., supra note 12, at 1.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2.
110. Id.
111. Letter from Robert Feldman, supra note 53.
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issued in 2013, severely limiting the reports’ functionality for both banks
and their communities.112 Moreover, there are still communities—
especially those with a large number of online banks—where the amount
of money available for CRA-eligible investments is high, generally
exceeding the actual needs of the community (“CRA hotspots”). 113 This
is an issue because there are CRA deserts where there is not enough
money available to meet the needs of their community.114
Finally, there is uncertainty as to what counts, particularly when
discussing community development loans and investments. 115 This lack
of clarity could lead to fewer investments that actually respond to
community needs and could eventually lead to less investment overall.116
The examination process not only varies from regulator to regulator, but
within each individual agency.117 Previously, all three agencies followed
the same set of rules.118
As of October 2020, the OCC has adopted its final rule; the FRB
is working on a different rule; and the FDIC is still subject to the former
rule.119 This has led to confusion for banks as to what set of regulations
they must abide by, while the chance of regulatory arbitrage has
increased.120 The OCC also has way more bank assets under its
jurisdiction, so it can be viewed as having the most influential force
among the three regulators, which could lead to even more confusion. 121
The OCC controls a higher percentage of overall banks as well, so the
agency has the most power out of all the bank regulators over all the
banks in the United States.122 These uncertainties could potentially

112. Id.
113. Id.; see also Letter from Julius Robinson, Managing Director, MUFG Union Bank,

N.A., to Joseph Otting, Comptroller of the Currency, and Jelena McWilliams, Chair, Fed.
Deposit. Ins. Corp. (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2020/2020community-reinvestment-act-regulations-3064-af22-c485.pdf#:~:text=The%20CRA%20hotspots%20are%20also%20where%20large%20concent
rations,will%20limit%20CRA%20hotspots%20and%20reduce%20CRA%20deserts
[https://perma.cc/3UHL-SEM7] (explaining how “CRA hotspots” are “where large
concentrations of banks who have the same CRA obligations are located”).
114. Letter from Robert Feldman, supra note 53.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Goodman, et al., supra note 12, at 2–3.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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include superficial examinations of a bank’s community development
activity in many of their assessment areas. 123
IV. CONCLUSION
A.

Why Didn’t the FDIC Adopt the Final Rule?

The general consensus seems to be that the OCC’s final rule was
rushed.124 “This final 372-page set of rules came just six weeks after the
close of the public comment period, a record-breaking pace, and a day
before Comptroller Otting resigned from the agency.”125 Many
commenters seemed distressed that the OCC’s final rule was finalized
during the COVID-19 pandemic and claim that it will harm many
communities suffering from the pandemic.126 However, it is important to
note that some people believe that the pandemic is a reason to accelerate
the need for the rule.127 Comptroller Otting stated, “[t]he [COVID-19]
pandemic has only made it more dire that communities—particularly
[LMI] neighborhoods—need more capital and better access to credit. And
they need it now."128
The timing was also not right for the FDIC to ask small
community banks to meet new regulatory requirements.129 Bank officials
emphatically agreed with this idea because they were concerned that they
do not have the necessary tools and time to implement changes to their
CRA operations while they are trying to deal with the small-business
lending program and other issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic.130
The rule has also become increasingly political.131 The House
Democrats were much more willing to pass the regulations as opposed to
123. Letter from Robert Feldman, supra note 53.
124. See generally Anna Hrushka, OCC Defends Timing, Lack of Support for CRA Revamp,

BANKING DIVE (May 21, 2020), https://www.bankingdive.com/news/CRA-occ-federalreserve-Otting-FDIC-regulatory-support/578421/
[https://perma.cc/4G3L-4SHA]
(explaining why the FDIC did not accept the final rule, while the OCC believes that the timing
was acceptable).
125. See id. (quoting Jesse Van Tol, CEO of the National Community Reinvestment
Coalition).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Otting, supra note 7.
129. Claire Williams, FDIC Won’t Join OCC’s Revamped Anti-Redlining Rule, Sources
Say,
MORNING
CONSULT
(June
15,
2020,
6:00
PM),
https://morningconsult.com/2020/06/15/fdic-occ-community-reinvestment-act-rule/
[https://perma.cc/CX3Y-A6MX].
130. Id.
131. Id.
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the House Republicans, which are largely symbolic of the pandemic and
social issues.132 The rule is becoming more of a social issue as racial
inequity is underlined by protests over George Floyd’s death in
Minneapolis police custody, so the FDIC was hesitant to adopt the rule
out of a desire to placate concerns over social issues, rather than to meet
a need for updates.133
B.

Will the FDIC Eventually Adopt the Final Rule?

When asked if the FDIC will eventually adopt the final rule, the
consensus among most commentators appears to be, “yes.”134 The FDIC
was originally supposed to adopt the regulations with the OCC, but
dropped the proposed regulations at the end due to the aforementioned
reasons.135 Since the FDIC controls state-chartered banks and the OCC
controls nationally chartered banks, this has created opportunities for
regulatory arbitrage and also created a separation between state and
nationally chartered banks.136 Since the goal of the OCC and the FDIC
is the same in this matter, a solution will likely be worked out in order to
maintain consistency.137
The OCC’s proposed rule made specific numeric thresholds that
banks would be subject to in different aspects of the general performance
standards, including the CRA Evaluation Measure, the Community
Development Minimum, and the Retail Lending Distribution Tests.138
The OCC omitted key numeric thresholds in the final rule, stating that it
had not done enough research to justify these thresholds.139 Instead, the
OCC will continue to gather data on what thresholds are appropriate and
will set such benchmarks through a notice-and-comment process.140

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See generally Scott A. Coleman & Lori J. Sommerfield, OCC CRA Final Rule: What’s

Next for the FDIC and Federal Reserve Board?, BALLARD SPAHR LLP (July 15, 2020),
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2020/07/15/occ-cra-final-rule-whats-next-forthe-fdic-and-federal-reserve-board/ [https://perma.cc/R65A-64HG] (arguing why the FDIC
will adopt the final rule when they believe an adequate amount of time had passed to review
all of its functions).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. COVINGTON, supra note 75, at 7.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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Once numeric thresholds are put in place, the FDIC is more likely to join
the OCC’s rulemaking.141
“The rule also does not specify how (or whether) the OCC will
evaluate a bank’s CRA performance between the time of its last
evaluation under the previous CRA rules and the date of the rule.” 142 If
more specific information becomes available as to how a bank’s CRA
performance will be evaluated before the compliance date of the final
rule, the FDIC would be more ready to accept the regulations.143 An
argument can be made that banks should not be held to standards that
they do not understand, and the FDIC does not want to waste time and
resources in instructing all of its examiners to evaluate banks based on
whatever standard should be applied.144
The FDIC was also hesitant to adopt the regulations due to it
being rushed by the OCC.145 The COVID-19 pandemic played into this
decision, as some argued that it needed to be rushed out, despite not being
completely ready. 146 The FDIC may be willing to join the OCC once the
pandemic’s economic effect stabilizes. 147 The OCC will also have
additional time to judge the efficacy of their new rules. 148
The FDIC did not think it would be wise to impose new CRA
standards on small community banks to meet the new standard since there
are many issues that small banks must deal with just to stay afloat during
the COVID-19 pandemic.149 However, once the pandemic ends, there
will be fewer burdens on small community banks, so the FDIC may be
more willing to adopt the OCC’s CRA rule.150
Just as the pandemic pushed the FDIC to hold out on adopting the
rule, the same can be said about the political concerns of racial
inequality.151 The importance of such a social movement cannot be put
into words.152 However, the FDIC does not want to finalize a rule

141. See id. (showing that the lack of numeric thresholds was a contributing factor in the
FDIC ultimately deciding not to adopt the final rule).
142. Id.
143. See id. (describing different ways the final rule can be modified to make it more
appealing for the FDIC to eventually adopt).
144. Id.
145. Hrushka, supra note 124.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Williams, supra note 129.
150. Hrushka, supra note 124.
151. Williams, supra note 129.
152. Id.
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affecting all state nonmember banks as a reaction to the movement.153
Since the FDIC felt that the rule was rushed and that it had been finalized
in an attempt to seek social justice, it did not sign off and instead wanted
to give more time for many of the issues in the rule to be addressed. 154
Essentially, the FDIC may think it would be a good idea to adopt the rule
if modifications are made to the existing rule.155 Letting time pass will
be the best way to allow the FDIC to adopt the regulations in a way that
they feel is not rushed.156
Although the FDIC may think it would be a good idea to
eventually adopt the final rule, the FRB may not have the same
thoughts.157 Since the OCC’s final rule was passed, the FRB issued an
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“ANPR”) that also attempts to
modify the prior CRA regulations.158 However, these updates do not
exactly match the updates of the OCC’s final rule. The updates show that
the FRB may not join the FDIC in potentially adopting the OCC’s final
rule if the FDIC ultimately decides to do so.159
Although the ANPR matches the final rule in the non-exhaustive
list of qualifying activities and expanding deposit-based assessment
areas, it differs from the OCC’s final rule in that it focuses more on
addressing inequities in credit access, ensuring an inclusive financial
services industry, and minimizing the reporting burden on regulators.160
This is a shift from the final rule’s focus on objective standards to be met
for evaluating a bank’s CRA performance. 161 Federal Reserve Board
Governor Lael Brainard showed her dissatisfaction with the passage of
the final rule when she said, “it is much more important to get reform
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Board

Issues Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking On an Approach To Modernize Regulations
That Implement the Community Reinvestment Act (Sept. 21, 2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20200921a.htm#:~:text=The
%20Federal%20Reserve%20Board%20on,banking%20landscape%20and%20better%20me
et [https://perma.cc/N37K-D4BU] (explaining how the FRB had different thoughts regarding
community reinvestment than the FDIC).
158. Id.
159. Federal Reserve Releases Community Reinvestment Act Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, AFFORDABLE HOUS. TAX CREDIT COAL (Sept. 21, 2020),
https://www.taxcreditcoalition.org/federal-reserve-releases-community-reinvestment-actadvance-notice-of-proposed-rulemaking/ [https://perma.cc/Y2NC-XQXU] [hereinafter Tax
Cred.].
160. Id.
161. Id.
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right than to do it quickly.”162 This also feeds the theory that letting time
pass to allow modifications to be made to the final rule could entice the
FDIC to eventually adopt the final rule.163
It may be likely that the FRB will not adopt the final rule and will
instead focus on making their own CRA regulations.164 This stance by
the FRB will have a significant impact on the FDIC’s adoption of the
final rule, since the FRB’s willingness to create their own CRA
regulations may motivate the FDIC to do the same.165 This would not
help the OCC in its attempt to create a uniform system for evaluating
CRA standards.166 Additionally, this would create an apparent ridge
between the standards of nationally chartered banks and state chartered
banks, potentially leading to chaos in the future.167
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